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Transition from Fetus to Infant:
A Problem for Law and Ethics
By ALBERT R. JONSEN*
It is unusual-perhaps unheard of-for an "ethicist" to author a
preface to an issue of a law journal. However, the nature of the subject
addressed by this symposium, Issues in Procreational Autonomy, de-
mands something unusual: the topic evokes profound personal emotions,
excites bitter social debates, draws upon a long tradition of moral reflec-
tion, and raises deeply embedded principles of the common law.
Mothers and fathers, physicians and lawyers, philosophers and theolo-
gians express vital interest in the issue and in its policy and legal implica-
tions. The fetus in utero and the infant extra uterum are affected
radically and ultimately, for law and policy can mean for them life and
death. History and anthropology also must be explored, for other times
and other cultures view the fetus and newborn so differently that our
implicit and explicit values, even when clear, are called into question.
With all this involved, the topic certainly goes beyond the usual pale of
the law. Where, in fact, it does belong is unclear. Thus, a practitioner of
the new discipline of medical ethics-which has unclear conceptual
boundaries-may be just the person to preface the more specific consid-
erations of lawyers.
Indeed, the Supreme Court of the United States issued the writ that
permits persons like myself to engage in this legal discussion. In Roe v.
Wade, I the Court comments,
We need not resolve the difficult question of when life begins. When
those trained in the respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and
theology are unable to arrive at any consensus, the judiciary, at this
point in the development of man's knowledge, is not in a position to
speculate as to the answer.2
This comment deserves exegesis. First, despite the Court's skepticism,
the famous decision ranges widely over medical and social history, philo-
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sophical opinion, and theological doctrine. Even if no consensus can be
found, all this, to a greater or lesser extent, is relevant to thinking about
the problem, for our current views are shaped by our past, and our cur-
rent efforts to reformulate require careful criticism of that past. In ques-
tions so profound as the "beginning of life" or its "nature and destiny" or
its "value," consensus is not to be expected. Humans live so variably and
in such diverse situations that they must see themselves and their nature
in different ways. However, if consensus is not the point, wisdom is. We
must strive to see ourselves and our perennial problems, not merely in
the narrow perspective of pressing issues, but in the larger view of our
cultural tradition. This is one justification for the presence of philoso-
phers and theologians.
A second word in the Court's remark deserves attention, namely,
"speculate." Speculation is the paramount activity of philosophers and
theologians. This does not mean that they engage in, as Webster's says,
"idle," "casual," or inconclusive 3 ruminations about things (though they
may occasionally do so). Rather, it refers to their efforts to view things
in broad perspective; the word literally means to observe from a watch-
tower. It is the privilege of philosophy and theology to stand apart from
immediate and pressing events in order to discern meaning and value.
This is a task not accomplished quickly, for questions are perennial. For
this reason, the speculation of philosophers and theologians does look
inconclusive, and no consensus appears. Yet, their speculation is fruitful,
for it reminds us that any current resolution must be reviewed and re-
vised, and that any contemporary opinion will be outmoded.
Thus, the Court was quite right in saying it "was not in a position to
speculate" about the beginning of life. Courts do not enjoy the privilege
of philosophical or theological speculation, though they may on occasion
usurp it. They are governed by the immediate and the pressing. They
must resolve disputes; they must render judgments. They must be con-
stantly vigilant that the particular decisions they hand down do not un-
dermine the general structure of the law. Their determinations must be
practical, applicable to the worlds of economics, business, medicine, and
so forth. Thus, precisely as a court, they are not in a position to specu-
late, although they can be informed and illumined (and possibly con-
fused) by the speculations of others.
This is germane to cooperation between lawyers and philosophers in
an area such as the policy and law about the fetus and the newborn. The
speculations of philosophers and theologians will take a broader and
3. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2188 (1976).
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longer perspective than the determinations of the law, yet both are neces-
sary for a satisfactory appreciation of the nature of the problem. The law
must be patient with the speculation and sit still to learn from it; the
speculators must be tolerant of the practical and procedural demands of
the law. Nowhere more than on the border between medical law and
medical ethics is this patience and tolerance needed. Nowhere, in my
opinion, can cooperation be more profitable than at this border.
It is at this border that we see familiar legal doctrines such as tres-
pass, homicide, battery, and contract challenged by the invasiveness of
modern technology, the ability to sustain organic life in the absence of
personal life, the multiple touchings and maulings inflicted for the sake of
fleeting benefit, the complexity of the relationship between a patient and
many physicians. It is also at this border that we see abstractions about
the value of life, its quality, and its sanctity challenged by the concrete
realities of harms, costs, incompetence, and neglect. True, this border
has long been the scene of skirmishes, particularly under the banner of
malpractice. It is important not to allow the skirmishes to escalate into
terrible strife over the questions of life and death, for, in these matters,
there is enough suffering. Medical law and medical ethics must enter
into conversations at the border.
The conversations about the life and death of the fetus and the new-
born, and about the rights of parents, infant, and the state, have barely
begun. But, unfortunately, they have been more shouting matches than
conversations. Roe v. Wade was engendered in controversy that has
grown in complexity and acerbity. Two well-known cases, those of In-
fant Doe of Bloomington 4 and Baby Jane Doe of Long Island, 5 pushed
what had been a relatively quiet conversation about neonatal intensive
care into the center of debate and led to the issuance of federal regula-
tions6 and a case before the United States Supreme Court.7 Questions
that were entirely speculative a decade ago, such as in vitro fertilization
and embryo transfer, burst into full-blown ethical and legal problems
before ethical and legal concepts were mature enough to accept them.
The prospect of efficacious medical and surgical interventions on the fe-
tus in utero raises ethical and legal questions previously unthought of.
At the center of all these discussions is the fetus. We should be
4. In re Infant Doe, No. GU 8204-004A (Monroe County Cir. Ct., Ind. Apr. 12, 1982),
cert denied sub nom., Infant Doe v. Bloomington Hosp., 464 U.S. 961 (1983).
5. Weber v. Stony Brook Hosp., 95 A.D.2d 567, 467 N.Y.S.2d 685, aff'd, 50 N.Y.2d
208, 456 N.E.2d 1186, 469 N.Y.S.2d 63, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1027 (1983).
6. 45 C.F.R. § 84.55 (1985).
7. Bowen v. American Hosp. Ass'n, 106 S. Ct. 2101 (1986).
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careful about objectifying "the fetus": even if it is considered by some
not to be a "person," we have all, without exception, been fetuses, and
every future member of our race will be one. Thus, whatever their moral
and legal status, they are quite unique entities. This is perhaps what
makes it so difficult to determine precisely what their legal and moral
status actually is or should be. Determining legal and moral status con-
sists of placing something or someone into a clearly defined class, so that
actions toward that class can be categorized and responsibilities deter-
mined. The definitions of the classes are usually based to some extent on
the nature of the thing and, to some extent, on artificial or conventional
views of it. Thus, animals are distinguished from persons largely on the
basis of perceived differences of nature; professionals are distinguished
from nonprofessionals largely by convention.
The fetus, however, lives in several worlds and its nature is by no
means clear. It is en ventre sa mere, but it is there precisely to exit and
enter the social world. It is thoroughly dependent on maternal "life sup-
port," but can, if ready, become independent of that system with aston-
ishing speed. It is, for the last few weeks of its interuterine life, very
much like it will be in its extrauterine life, but if expelled slightly too
early, it suffers major disadvantages for survival in a world of ambient
oxygen. Indeed, the premature-clearly an infant for purposes of the
law-is much more a "born fetus" in terms of its physiology. It is unfin-
ished in its intrinsic "life-support systems," that is, its cardio-pulmonary
capabilities.
Add to these anomalies the perplexing question of who can lay legal
and moral claim to the fetus or the newborn. If, as noted above, it can
become physiologically independent with astonishing rapidity, it remains
radically dependent on mature members of its species for a long period of
time. Its survival depends, not merely on the maturity of its lungs and
the post-natal recycling of its circulation, but more on its being taken up
into the arms of nurturing parents and protected from myriad environ-
mental threats. To whom does the fetus "belong"? The answer seems to
many moderns quite obvious: it must belong to the person in whose
body it is being nurtured. Roe v. Wade seems to accept this common
notion. Yet, on examination, the truth of this notion is far from obvious.
Some might assert a paternal claim, stronger or equal to, the maternal.
In ancient Roman law, the Lex Julia, it seems, vested in the father all
rights over the fetus engendered by him. The fetus itself, some assert, has
claims in its own right that ought not be overridden by parental choices.
Finally, the state may exercise the suggestively named right of parens
patriae. But, even apart from the difficulty of sorting out all these possi-
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ble claims and justifying them, the very notion of "belonging" may be
questioned: in what sense should concepts developed primarily to deal
with property be applied to the young of the species, born or unborn?
All these matters will not be resolved at the bar; they must be
thought through by scholars, their dimensions appreciated by the public,
and policies both realistic and sensitive crafted by administrators and leg-
islators. The symposium that appears in this journal should be part of
the discourse that must go on between law and ethics. Mostly the voices
of the lawyers are heard (although one of those lawyers is also a moral
philosopher), but perhaps the interesting questions they raise and the ap-
proaches they propose will engender a response from the other partici-
pants in this crucial conversation. I hope that Hastings College of the
Law and its sister institution, University of California, San Francisco,
might become the forum for such a continued and informed
conversation.

